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NOTES
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN DIVORCE ACTIONS
The courts of Pennsylvania have held uniformly that insanity is not ground
for divorce.1 It is equally well settled that insanity cannot be a defense to a
libel in divorce, unless the respondent was insane at the time of the commission
of the act which is the ground for divorce.2 But any discussion of the foregoing
problems is certain to raise several questions which have not found definite
answers in the Pennsylvania decisions. Is insanity at the time of the commis-
sion of the act of divorce a good defense to a libel in divorce? Is partial
insanity a defense to a libel in divorce? Will thL- law undertake to distinguish
IMintz v. Mintz, 83 Pa. Super. 85. The Act of April 18, 1905, P.L. 211, amending Act
of April 13, 1843, P.L. 233, does not make insanity a new ground for divorce, but, so far as
the Act is related to the subject of divorce, regulates procedure only.
ZBenjeski v. Benjeski, 150 Pa. Super. 57; Kolesar v. Kolesar, 28 Dist. 305; 3 Temple
L.Q. 202 (1929).
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among various degrees of lack of control short of insanity and select those
which will prevent a divorce and those which will not? The answers to these
questions will be the scope of this paper.
INSANITY As A DEFENSE
A. Adultery
Insanity has long been a good defense to a criminal charge of adultery,3
and it would seem to follow that it would likewise be a good defense to the
less serious civil charge in a divorce libel. However, the views of the Penn-
sylvania courts have been far from conventional. To best understand their
decisions, we must look at the reasons behind them.
In the early English cases4 adultery was considered more a social offense
than a moral one. The offense was deemed more serious when committed by
the wife than when committed by the husband; thus, a husband was able to
bring a successful action for divorce in this instance, but the wife had no such
right. This theory was based upon the proposition that adultery on the part
of the wife tended to bring illegitimate offspring into the household, while a
similar offense by the husband had no such grievous results. Little or no
consideration was given to the wrong done to the wife through defilement of
the marriage bed when the husband committed adultery.
So great was the influence of this reasoning that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania adopted it at its earliest opportunity.' In the famous case ot
Matchin v. Matchin,5 Mr. Chief Justice Gibson said:
"A wife's insanity, though so absolute as to have effaced
from her mind the first lin-es of conjugal duty, would not be a
defense to a libel for adultery, though it would be a defense to
an indictment for it. The offense is a social as well as a moral
one; and it is agreed by the civilians to be less grievous to the
sufferer, though not less immoral, when it is committed by the
husband, whose transgressions cannot impose supposititious off-
spring on the wife, than it is when committed by the wife,
whose trangression may impose such offspring on the husband.
. . .We are nevertheless at liberty to conclude that insanity
may be a bar to divorce at the wife, when it would not, in
similar circumstances, be a bar to divorce at suit of the husband.
To say the least, adultery committed under the irresistible im-
5Hitchler, CRIMINAL LAW, p. 132.
47 Mew's English Case Law 735; see also Yarrow v. Yarrow, (1892) Probate L.R. 92.
6Sturgeon, PENNA. LAW AND PROCEDURE IN DIVORCE, 2nd Ed.; Klein, p. 226.
66 Pa. 332, 47 Am. Dec. 466 (1847).
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pulse of that morbid activity of the sexual propensity which is
called nymitomania, or more recently, erotic mania, would
certainly be a ground of divorce, though not of indictment. The
great end of matrimony is not the comfort and convenience
of the immediate parties, though these are necessarily embarked
in it; the procreation of progeny having a legal title to main-
tenance by the father, and the reciprocal taking for better, for
worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love
and cherish till death, are important, but only modal conditions
of the contract and no more than ancillary to the principal
purpose of it. The civil rights created by them may be for-
feited by the misconduct of either party; but though the forfei-
ture can be incurred, so far as the parties themselves are con-
cerned, only by a responsible agent, it follows not that those
rights must not give way without it to public policy, and the
paramount purpose of the marriage--the procreation and pro-
tection of legitimate children, the institution of families, and
the creation on natural relations among mankind, from which
proceed all the civilization, virtue, and happiness to be found
in the world. The absurdity of the dogma, that marriage is a
sacrament, and dissoluble only by the head of the church, instead
of a political status subject to the power of the state, is manifest."
Close examination of this case shows that the views of Mr. Chief Justice
Gibson were only dicta and that the decision in the case was based upon other
issues. 7 Nevertheless, this opinion met with almost unanimous disapproval in
other states. 8
The courts of Vermont were particularly emphatic in saying:
"We have read the case of Matchin v. Matchin, supra, and the
opinion of the late Chief Justice Gibson, where he attempts to
maintain that the adultery of the wife, although insane, is suffi-
cient ground for divorce, for the reason that it tends to impose
spurious offspring upon the husband. The reason is one which
will have no application to similar acts committed by the hus-
band, and, as applied to the wife, seems truly revolting to all
just sense of propriety and decency. We are surprised that such
opinion should ever have found admission into the reports, and
should be shocked at the prospect that it could ever gain gen-
eral countenance in the American republic".9
7See Matchin v. Matchin, supra, at p. 337. "So far I have treated the subject as if the
evidence made out a case of moral insanity, though, in point of legal effect, it does not."
8See Annotation, 42 A.L.R. 1531.
9Nichols v. Nichols, 31 Vt. 328, 73 Am. Dec. 352, (1858).
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Despite the obvious unfairness of the opinion and the host of out-of-state
criticisms, Pennsylvania courts have been reluctant to overule Matchin v.
Matehin,10 and this decision, unapproved and much maligned, is still cited
as a Pennsylvania authority."
How would this question be decided in Pennsylvania to-day? Would in-
sanity be allowed as a defense to a libel in divorce based upon adultery?
Analagous to the crime of adultery is the tort of criminal conversation.
Earliest decisions in trials for criminal conversation were motivated by theories
similar to those affecting the decisions in cases of adultery.12 The possibility
of bringing illegitimate children into the household was the paramount ques-
tion and the husband was allowed an action for criminal conversation when
another had illicit sexual intercourse with his wife, while the wife was not
allowed a similar action against one who had sexual intercourse with her
husband.
Today, modern legislation recognizes the equal rights and obligations of
husband and wifel' and a wife is allowed to sue for torts committed against
her legally protected marital interests." Just as the husband is given a cause
of action based upon the possibility of illegitimate offspring being introduced
into his household, the wife is given a cause of action based upon the defile-
ment of the marriage bed, the breach of exclusive right to marital intercourse,
and upon the possibility of physical contamination to herself and to future
legitimate offspring. 1
Mr. Chief Justice Gibson's opinion was influenced by the unequal status
of husband and wife in the effect on the household of adultery by one of the
spouses. Today, there is little doubt that the wife is equally wronged by adultery
committed by her husband. Even though his adulterous acts do not threaten
the household with illegitimate offspring, they do expose future legitimate
offspring of the marriage to disease and physical contamination. There is little
doubt that Matchin v. Matchin16 would not be followed in a similar case
arising under present conditions. To allow the husband to obtain a divorce
from his wife on the basis of acts committed while she was insane is altogether
repulsive to modern legal thought. That the courts will overrule Matchin v.
Matchin17 at the earliest opportunity is somewhat indicated in a quotation from
Hansell v. Hansell' where the Court, in discussing the Matchin case, said:
I oSupra.
I tWilliams v. Williams, 24 Del. Co. 465.
123 BL. COMM. 139 (Lewis' Ed., 1902).
1348 PS 111.
1471 U. OF PA. LAw REv. 395; 4 A.L.R. 569, 28 A.L.R., 327.





"Without now expressing an opinion whether that decision
would be sustained by the spirit and tendency of later juris-
prudence, it may be said that the decision excluded altogether
the question of intention or will and was based entirely on the
effect of the act in casting doubt upon the legitimacy of off-
spring and the Judge strongly intimated that the decision might
have been different if the husband had been the guilty party."
B. Desertion
The Divorce Law of Pennsylvania 19 states that desertion is a ground for
divorce if a spouse "shall have committed wilful and malicious desertion, and
absence from the habitation of the injured and innocent spouse, without a
reasonable cause, for and during the space of two years." Since the desertion
must be "wilful and malicious", there is little doubt that a pgrson, insane at
the time of desertion, is incapable of "wilfully and maliciously" deserting his
spouse, and that such insanity at the time of the commission of the act of
divorce would be a complete defense to an action of divorce brought by the
injured spouse.20
This rule will apply not only to those cases where the respondent was
insane at the time of the desertion, but also to those cases in which the
respondent became insane within two years after the desertion. The courts
have held that subsequent insanity of the deserter within the two year period
nullifies the requisite mental element and changes the desertion to mere separa-
tion. Judge Orlady, in Litle v. Little,2' ruled as follows:
"From the date of the committment of the respondent as
an insane person, he could not be held to be persisting in a
wilful and malicious desertion, because he was not only irre-
sponsible for his acts, but was deprived of exercising a wilful
act. Separation is not desertion. Desertion is an actual abandon-
ment of matrimonial cohabitation, with an intent to desert, wil-
fully and maliciously persisted in, without cause, for two years.
The guilty intent is manifested when, without cause or consent,
either party withdraws from the residence of the other party:
Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 49 Pa. 251. This refers to the inception
of the desertion, but it is clear that, under our statute, it must
be wilfully and maliciously persisted in for two years, in order
to entitle the libellant to a divorce on ground of desertion."
It is interesting to note that, in Little v. Little,22 the respondent was com-
mitted to a hospital for the insane two years and seven days after his original
desertion, having wilfully and maliciously persisted in the act of desertion for
19 Act of May 2, 1929, P.L. 1237; 23 PS 10.
2
OFreedman, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN PENNA,, p, 648.
2156 Pa. Super. 419, 420. See also Mann v. Mann, 14 D.&C. 303 and Commonwealth v.
Stevens, 25 Pa. C.C. 68.
221bid.
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the requisite two year period. Therefore, a divorce was granted to the libellant,
but it is clear from the opinion that if the insanity had occurred within the
two year period, the insanity would have been a complete defense to the libel
in divorce and the divorce would not have been granted.
25
C. Cruelty and Indignities
A divorce will be granted in Pennsylvania if the libellant can prove that
the respondent "shall have, by cruel and barbarous treatment, endangered the
life of the injured and innocent spouse"; or "shall have offered such indignities
to the person of the injured and innocent spouse, as to render his or her
condition intolerable and life burdensome." These two grounds for divorce
are usually found together and, for our purposes, can be discussed as one.
The courts have rightfully held that these acts of divorce must b-e com-
mitted wilfully and intentionally, and that if any condition is present to destroy
the requisite mental element, the acts of the respondent, even though amounting
to cruel and barbarous treatment and indignities to the person, will not be
grounds for divorce. This view was ably presented in Hansell v. Hansell,
24
where Judge Gordon stated:
"The evil and malicious will must be present to constitute
an act cruel and barbarous and an insulting intent to make it an
indignity. Accidental acts, no matter how injurious, would not
be sufficient, for the wrongful intent would be absent. For this
reason, therefore, insanity would also deprive the conduct of
the element of wilful purpose necessary to sustain the statutory
cause of divorce."
That insanity at the time of the commission of the cruelties and indignities
will be a complete defense to a libel in divorce founded upon these grounds
is conclusively held in a recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case, Benieski v.
Benjeski.2 5 Here, the respondent developed a well known form of insanity
and uncontradicted testimony was given by a competent physician that the
emotional instability of the respondent and her conduct upon which the libellant
relied as ground for divorce were attributable to the disease. Judge Kenworthey
affirmed the decree of the lower court dismissing the libel.
Insanity as a defense to a libel in divorce charging cruelty and indignities
differs from the defense to a similar libel charging desertion in that the
respondent must be shown to have been insane at the time of the commission
of the act. We have seen that insanity of the respondent within two years
after the initial desertion will nullify the requisite mental element and change
2 8For a general discussion of this problem, see 4 A.L.R. 1333.
2 4Supra. See also, Fritzinger v. Fritzinger, 5 Kulp 507.
25Benjeski v. Benjeski, 150 Pa. Super. 57.
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the desertion to a mere separation. In using the defense of insanity to a charge
of cruelty and indignities, the respondent must be shown to have been insane
at the time of the commission of the acts. Insanity which antedates the acts
will not be a defense to them and a divorce will be granted.
28
Where a husband, by cruel and barbarous treatment and indignities to
her person, forced his wife to withdraw from the home, and he afterwards
became insane, his insanity in no way affected the wife's right to a divorce. 27
Where evidence showed that a wife was guilty of cruelty, the husband was
not deprived of the effect of such evidence by proof that the wife was in-
cipiently insane when the several acts occurred and later did become insane.2 8
It may be well to note here that in those cases wherein the respondent to
a divorce libel becomes insane after the commission of the act of divorce and
is non compos mentis when the libel in divorce is filed, the court of Common
Pleas will have jurisdiction to receive the petition and proceedings will be the
same as in other proceedings in divorce.
29
PARTIAL INSANITY As A DEFENSE
Thus far, we have made no attempt to define or qualify the term "insan-
ity". It is quite clear that general insanity, i.e., such loss of control of mental
facilities as to render the respondent an unaccountable being, will be a com-
plete defense to a libel in divorce. In cases of general insanity, the test is the
power or capacity of the person to distinguish between right and wrong in
reference to the particular act in question.30
But suppose that the respondent was suffering from partial insanity at
the time of the commission of the act? Suppose that he is insane on one
particular point, but is a responsible being on all others?8 1 Would such
impairment of mentality render him immune to proceedings in divorce?
This defense is one which frequently has been raised in our criminal
courts, but which has been comparatively rare as a defense in divorce actions.
The discussion of Mr. Chief Justice Gibson in Commonwealth v. Mosler 2 has
long been considered classic on this point and has been cited favorably and
without exception:
"A man may be mad on all subjects; and then, though he
have glimmerings of reason, he is not a responsible agent. This
2 6
McDermott v. McDermott, 47 Pa. C.C. 151.
2 7
Kolesar v. Kolesar, 28 Dist. 305.
2SRemsch v. Remsch, 13 D.&C. 373.
29Act of May 2, 1929, P.L. 1237, Sec. 18, 25.
80Sayres v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. 291, 298.
3132 C.J. 601.
824 Pa. 264.
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is general insanity; but if it, be not so great in its extent or de-ree to blind him to the nature and consequences of his moral
uty, it is no defense to an accusation of crime. It must be so
great as to entirely destroy his perception of right and wrong;
and it is not until that perception is thus destroyed that he
ceases to be responsible. It must amount to delusion or halluci-
nation, controlling his will and making the commission of the
act, in his apprehension, a duty of overruling necessity. The
most apt illustration of the latter is the perverted sense of
religious obligation which has caused men to sacrifice their
wives and children. Partial insanity is confined to a particular
subject, the man being sane on every other. In that species of
madness, it is plain that he is a responsible agent if he were
not instigated by his madness to perpetrate the act. He continues
to be a legitimate subject of punishment, although he may have
been labouring under a moral obliquity of perception, as much
so as if he were merely labouring under an obliquity of vision.
A man whose mind squints, unless impelled to crime by this
overt mental obliquity, is as much amenable to punishment as
one whose eye squints. On this point, there has been a mistake,
as melancholy as it is popular. It has been announced by learned
doctors; that if a man has the least taint of insanity entering
into his mental structure, it discharges him of all responsibility
to the laws. To this monstrous error can be traced the fecundity
in homicides, which has dishonoured this country, and the
immunity that has attended them. The law is, that whether the
insanity be general or partial, the degree of it must be so great
as to have controlled the will of its subject and to have taken
from him the freedom of moral action."
If partial insanity has thus been recognized as a valid defense to a criminal
charge where it can be shown that the degree of insanity was "so great as to
have controlled the will of its subject and to have taken from him the freedom
of moral action", should it not follow that partial insanity to a similar degree
should be a complete defense to a libel in divorce? A spouse, sane in all other
respects, may be suffering from erotomania. Should adultery committed while
under the influence of this mental disorder be a ground for a divorce action
against that spouse? To grant a divorce in such an instance would be to in-
directly allow a divorce grounded upon insanity of the respondent, a policy
long condemned in Pennsylvania.
The line distinguishing between a party partially insane and one who is
responsible for his acts is often a difficult one to draw. In Remsch v. Remsch,
33
the husband sued for divorce on the ground of cruel and barbarous treatment.
It was shown, as a defense, that the wife was "incipiently insane" when the
several acts of cruelty were committed. The court granted the divorce, holding
3$Supra.
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that the wife was responsible for these acts which were grounds for divorce.
Several out-of-state decisions have held that "mental irresponsibility is not
sufficient if the respondent comprehended his ways"., 4 Another case granted
a divorce against a person afflicted with paranoia at the time of the commission
of the acts of divorce.
35
In Benjeski v. Benjeski,3 6 a very recent case, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court cited with apparent approval a doctrine set forth in a Maryland case37
to the effect that "the law does not undertake to distinguish among the various
degrees of lack of control short of insanity and select those which prevent a
divorce and those which do not." But a complete reading of this opinion
would seem to indicate that the Pennsylvania courts would consider partial
insanity as a defense, or at least, as a major factor in the final decision upon
the libel.
Although the tests advocated by Justice Gibson in Commonwealth v.
osler s could be applied to insanity in divorce actions as well as to insanity
in criminal cases, a Common Pleas court decision in Thomas v. Thomas" has
ably and clearly stated the test applicable to insanity, whether it be general
or special, when such insanity is used as a defense in divorce actions. The
Court stated as follows:
"The test in such cases is whether, at the time the acts were
committed the respondent was in such a mental condition as to
deprive him of the use of his reason to the extent that he did
not know right from wrong and was incapable of willing the
one or the other."
JOHN H. HIBBARD
84214 N.W. 133; 129 A. 122.
38 Dochelli v. Dochelli, 6 A. (2nd) 475.
86Supra.
37Kruse v. Kruse, 179 Md. 657, 22 A. (2nd) 475.
3Ssupra.
8919 Lehigh L.J. 45.
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